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n; THE SuPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
FLORENCE GILLMOR,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CASE NOS. 16023, 16221

EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR,

(CONSOLIDATED)

Defendant-Appellant.

* * * * * * *
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ON BOTH CONSOLIDATED APPEALS

* * * * * * *
STATEViliNT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a suit for a declaratory judgment that defendant
Edward Gillmor is not entitled to a two-year renewal of three
leases on real property located in Summit, Tooele and Salt Lake
Counties.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Partial Summary Judgment
The trial court entered partial summary judgment in this
action on July 25, 1978, aeclaring that defendant was not
entitled to renew the two leases on the Tooele and Summit
County properties.

The trial court denied summary judgment on

the Salt Lake County lease on the grounds that possible triable
issues
of byfact
remained
for for
resolution
that of Museum
lease.
The
Sponsored
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
digitization provided on
by the Institute
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

effect of the court's partial summary judgment order was to
terminate the Tooele and Summit County leases between plaintiff
and defendant on December 31, 1978.

Case No. 16023 is an

appeal by defendant from that order.
Disposition at Trial
Trial on the issues remaining for resolution on the Salt
Lake County lease occurred on November 6, 1978, and following
that trial the court entered findings and conclusions and
judgment in favor of plaintiff, ruling that the Salt Lake
County lease, like the other two leases, would terminate on
December 31, 1978 with no right of renewal

(R. 180-81).

The

trial court also independently concurred with the law and
motion judge's findings on the earlier partial summary judgment
(R. 180).

Case No. 16221 is an appeal from the final judgment

in this case.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff submits that both judges below properly ruled in
her favor and that both the partial summary judgment order and
the final judgment should be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Facts before the court below in
the summary judgment motion
Since 1970 the plaintiff and defendant have been tenants
in common of some 32,000 acres of land located in Salt Lake,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
-2-may contain errors.

Tooele and Summit Counties

(R. 2).

Plaintiff has a one-half

interest in those properties, defendant has a one-quarter
interest, and another relative, Charles Frank Gillmor, who is
not a party to this action, owns the remaining one-quarter
interest in those properties (R. 17).
At the time this action was instituted, the Gillmor
properties had been partitioned in kind among the three cotenants

(R. 13).

At that time, each party was the owner of

undivided fee interests in the Gillmor lands (descriptions of
the properties awarded to each co-tenant are attached to
plaintiff's complaint as Exhibit "B")

(R.

13,16).

1

In 1969, Edward Lincoln Gillmor, the father of plaintiff
Florence Gillmor, leased his one-half interest in all the
Gillmor livestock properties to the defendant and to Stephen T.
Gillmor, leases which are attached to the complaint as Exhibits
"C",

"D" and "E 11

(R.

45-61).

In 1970, Edward Lincoln Gillmor

died and plaintiff, his daughter, succeeded to his one-half
interest in the Gillmor properties, subject to the three leases
(R.

119,116).

Stephen T. Gillmor later assigned all his right,

title and interest in those leases to defendant in 1972, and he
no longer has any interest in the properties at issue here.
( R. 3 at

~~

4 , R. 6 7 at

~I

4) .

1

Following entry of both partial summary judgment and final
judgment in this case, the Utah Supreme Court ruled on the
partition appeal and remanded that case for further proceedings, so the parties are tenants in common again at the present
time, a matter further discussed infra at 22-23. Gillmor v.
Gillmor, Case No. 15457 (Utah March 23, 1979). That appeal had
not Sponsored
been byresolved
prior to disposition of the case at bar,
the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
however, so it Library
is not
in this
of the brief.
Servicesdiscussed
and Technology Act, administered
by thesection
Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Each of the three leases is for an identical ten year term
and contains nearly identical provisions throughout.

The only

significant variance between them is each lease's description
of property subject to the lease, as each is for property in
different counties.

The sole provision on which this suit

turns is the following option to renew, which also appears in
each lease:
The Lessees have the option to extend
this lease for a period of two years
upon the expiration of this lease,
provided the ownership of this property
is vested in the present Lessor.
[R. 51,56,57,60; emphasis added].
Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she is the
successor in interest to the original lessor, Edward Lincoln
Gillmor, who died in 1970 and that each of the leases was due
to expire on November 15, 1978.

She prayed for a declaratory

judgment that the defendant was not entitled to a two-year
renewal of the leases under the above-quoted provision because
the "present Lessor" referred to therein was clearly a reference to her father, and since the property was no longer vested
in that "present Lessor," the defendant was not entitled to
renew any of the leases (R. 2-4).
Defendant denied in his answer that plaintiff was the
successor in interest to her father and denied that the leases
were to expire on November 15, 1978 (R. 68).
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Plaintiff thereafter brought the motion for summary judgment here appealed from, asserting in her supporting memorandum
that the language of each lease was clear and unambiguous, that
there were no material issues of fact, and that she was therefore entitled to summary judgment.

To obviate defendant's

denial in his answer that the plaintiff is her father's
successor in interest to the subject properties, she attached
as Exhibit "A" to that memorandum a copy of defendant's reply
to her counterclaim in the partition action, which admits
(l) that Florence Gillmor is in fact the owner of an undivided
interest in the subject property, and (2) that the Gillmor
property was leased by her father to defendant (R. 116,119)
by virtue of the same leases which are at issue in the case at
bar.
As to defendant's denial that the three leases were to
terminate on November 15, 1978, plaintiff obviated that
question of fact by stipulating, for purposes of the motion
for summary judgment, that the leases should terminate on
December 31, 1978 rather than on November 15th.

As each lease

states in its opening paragraph that the term of the lease is
from "1969 to 1978 .

. inclusive," that stipulation negated

any remaining issues of fact before the court.
The parties submitted prehearing and posthearing memoranda
(R. 73,86,101) supporting their respective positions and the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trial court heard oral arguments on plaintiff's motion.
Following submission of all briefs and the oral argument, the
court ruled that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment as
prayed for in her complaint as to the Tooele and Summit County
leases, but denied summary judgment on the Salt Lake County
lease because of a possible triable issue of fact.

2

At that point, defendant filed his appeal in Case 16023,
contesting the trial court's granting of partial summary judgment on the Tooele and Summit County leases.
Facts presented at trial
Plaintiff asserted at trial that the Salt Lake County
lease, like the other two leases, was clear and unambiguous and
that the reference in that lease to the ''present leasor,'

like

the other two leases, was clearly a reference to her father
only (R. 293-94).

Because her father had died in 1970, plaintiff

argued, defendant was not entitled to renew that lease, as the
lease provides for right of renewal only if ownership of the
subject property "is vested in the present Lessor"

(R. 255) .

Defendant sought to prove at trial {1) that the renewal
provision in the lease is ambiguous and therefore that evidence
of surrounding circumstances should be introduced; and

(2)

that

the present leases are nearly identical to leases executed 1n

2

The only distinction between the Salt Lake lease and the other
two leases is that plaintiff Florence Gillmor joined in the 1969
lease in Salt Lake County in order to lease 40 acres of real property which she owned at that time.
She did not, however, have
any interest at that time in any properties in the other two
counties and is nowhere identified as a party to those two leases.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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1953 and in 1957 between defendant and plaintiff's father
(R.

270,281).
While defendant asserts in his statement of facts

(final

judgment appeal brief at 5) that the trial court excluded
evidence of surrounding circumstances in 1969, when these
leases were executed, that assertion is wholly inaccurate.

It

is true that plaintiff sought to exclude evidence of surrounding circumstances, but the trial court sustained no objections
by plaintiff's counsel to such evidence.

Plaintiff introduced

little evidence on those surrounding circunstances, not because
of any rulings by the court below, but only because none of the
parties were able to recall those circumstances in response to
questions by defense counsel.
Plaintiff presented the following unrebutted evidence at
the trial.

First, Stephen T. Gillmor, defendant's partner at

the time these leases were executed (R. 258) ,

iden~ified

the

Salt Lake County lease and stated that Mr. Skeen, defendant's
counsel herein, had drafted that lease (R. 258,260).

He had no

recollection of any of the negotiations at that time concerning
the renewal option in that lease (R. 259) .
The plaintiff then testified that Edward Lincoln Gillmor,
described as the lessor in the Salt Lake County Lease (and the
other two leases), was her father, and that he had died in 1970
(R. 262), at which time she succeeded to his entire interest in
the Gillmor properties as the sole heir under his will (R. 265).
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Unlike the other two leases, plaintiff did sign the Salt
Lake County lease, and she testified that the only reason she
was a party to that lease was because she owned 40 acres of
property in Salt Lake County in 1969, which were leased to
defendant along with the other 7,000 acres of property designated in that lease.

She had no interest whatsoever in those

other 7, 000 acres in 1969 (R. 263-64).

She further testified

that, with the sole exception of that 40 acre parcel in Salt
Lake County, she had no interest in 1969 in any of the properties identified in any of the three leases at issue herein
(R.

264).
Plaintiff rested her case following that testimony and

defendant then took the stand.

He testified that he first

leased the half interest of plaintiff's father in the Gillmor
properties in 1953 (R. 268), and that a new lease was executed
with plaintiff's father in 1957 when Steve Gillmor joined
defendant's livestock business (R.269).

Defendant testified

that he had been unable to locate the 1957 lease (R. 269,280)
Defendant's counsel then asked him about the terms of that 1957
lease (R. 270).

The court overruled plaintiff's objection, to

that question and defendant then testified that he believed the
terms of the 1969 lease to be essentially similar to those of
the 1957 lease (R. 272).
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On the other hand, defendant recalled no discussions at
any time with plaintiff's father, with plaintiff herself, or
with anyone else regarding the renewal provisions at issue
herein (R. 273, 285-86).
Despite defendant's assertions to the contrary in his
brief on appeal, the only objection ultimately sustained by the
trial court to any question during the trial was to a rather
leading and ambiguous inquiry by plaintiff's counsel as to
whether defendant is now the only member of the Gillmor family
still active in the livestock business

(R. 277).

That objection

was based, not on the grounds that the lease is clear and
unambiguous, as defendant asserts in his brief, but on grounds
of relevancy (id.).

And the objection was clearly sustained,

not because all evidence of surrounding circumstances was to be
excluded, but only because of the irrelevance of that particular
inquiry (R. 278) .

As evidence by both parties prior to that

question had established that defendant was not the only
Gillmor family member involved in the livestock business in
1969, when the leases were executed, that objection to relevance was clearly well-taken, because the number of Gillmors
currently involved in the livestock business has no bearing on
surrounding circumstances in 1969, which defendant was attempting
to establish (R. 258,273).
Because the trial court did allow testimony by defendant
on predecessor leases and surrounding circumstances when those

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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leases were executed, plaintiff proceeded to test defendant's
recollection of negotiations for those leases and of their
terms.

That cross examination established that defendant had

very little recollection of the terms of those prior leases,
and that what recollection he did have was largely inaccurate.
Defendant asserted initially in cross examination that,
with the exception of different rental provisions, the 1953 and
1969 leases were "very similar"

(R. 281).

The 1953 lease was

then introduced into evidence and a few of its material provisions were compared with the 1969 lease

(R. 283-85).

While

the 1969 lease has a ten-year term with a two-year renewal
option, the 1953 lease had a one-year term with a one-year
renewal option (R. 283).

While the 1969 lease covers real

property only, the 1953 lease covered both real and personal
property (R. 284).

After review of those leases, defendant

eventually admitted that a number of material provisions in the
1953 and 1969 leases were entirely different (R. 285).
Of particular importance in this action, defendant also
acknowledged that there is no reference to a "present lessor"
in the 1953 lease (R. 285), and he did not believe that essentially the same renewal option was carried forward from 1953 to
1957 and finally into the 1969 lease (R. 282).

While defendant

initially asserted that the 1953, 1957 and 1969 leases were all
very similar, it eventually became clear that he has not been
able to find the 1957 lease, that his recollection of the terms

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

of

~he

1953 lease was extremely inaccurate, that the 1953 and

1969 leases were vastly different, and that he recalled none of
the negotiations which preceded execution of any of those
leases.
Plaintiff called Stephen Gillmor back to the stand as a
rebuttal witness after defendant rested his case.

Steve Gillmor

testified that, to the best of his recollection, the 1957 lease
was for a one-year term, which was renewed orally from year to
year thereafter until 1969 (R. 291).

That testimony was re-

inforced by references to the 1957 lease in a draft lease
extension agreement, drawn up in 1969 but never executed by the
parties (R. 290-91).

Steve Gillmor testified that, unlike the

1969 leases at issue herein, the 1957 lease did not have a tenyear term, and he recalled no reference in the 1957 lease's
renewal option to a "present lessor"

(R. 292).

In other words,

plaintiff also established, despite plaintiff's initial unsupported assertions to the contrary, that the 1957 and 1969
leases were as dissimilar as the 1953 and 1969 leases.
Following the trial, the court below ruled in favor of
plaintiff, finding that:
l.

Plaintiff has an ownership interest in the properties

described in the three leases, and defendant is a lessee of
plaintiff's interest in those properties.
2.

The material provisions of the three leases are

identical except for the fact that (a) the property described

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in each lease is in different counties, and (b) plaintiff is a
party to the Salt Lake County lease only.
3.

Each of the three leases expires on December 31,

4.

The individual identified as the 'present lessor'

1978.
in

each of the three leases is plaintiff's father, Edward Lincoln
Gillmor, who died in 1970.
5.

Plaintiff is her father's successor in interest to

those properties.
6.

The renewal option in all three leases is identical,

provides that the lease may be renewed only if the subject
property is still vested in the "present lessor," and is clear
and unambiguous.
7.

The only "present lessor" designated in any of the

three leases is plaintiff's father, and plaintiff is not a
"present lessor" within the meaning of any lease.
8.

When the present leases were executed, plaintiff's

only interest in any of the subject properties was in a 40 acre
parcel identified in her name at page 6 of the Salt Lake County
lease.
9.

The trial court independently concurred in the partial

summary judgment previously entered by Judge Winder and ruled
that defendant may not exercise the renewal option set forth in
any of the three leases (R. 177-182).
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Defendant then filed his appeal in Case 16221, contesting
the trial court's entry of judgment in plaintiff's favor.

ARGUMENT
The first two arguments herein are pertinent both to the
partial summary judgment and to the final judgment orders.

The

third argument pertains only to the summary judgment order, and
the last two arguments are pertinent only to the appeal from the
final judgment in this case.

POINT I
BOTH SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FINAL JUDGMENT
WERE PROPERLY ENTERED IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR
BECAUSE THE RENEWAL PROVISION IN ALL THREE LEASES
WAS A COVE~ANT PERSONAL TO EDWAPn LINCOLN GILLMOR,
PLAINTIFF'S FATHER.
Plaintiff argued both in her motion for summary judgment and
at trial that the clear and unambiguous language of all three
leases created a renewal covenant which was personal to plaintiff's father, which did not run with the land, and that
defendant therefore must be precluded from exercising the
renewal option because plaintiff's father no longer owns the
subject property.

Defendant argued, on the other hand, that

the renewal options are ambiguous, a contention which both the
law and motion judge and the trial judge properly rejected.
The language in question in all three leases is identical;
each renewal option provides:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Lessees have the option to extend this
lease for a period of two years upon ~he
expiration of this lease, provided the ownership of this property is vested in the present
Lessor.
[Emphasis added].
The Tooele and Summit County leases make no reference
whatsoever to plaintiff Florence Gillmor, and the "present
Lessor" referred to in those leases is clearly a reference to
Edward Lincoln Gillmor, plaintiff's father, who executed both
leases as lessor.
The Salt Lake County lease varies slightly from the other
two leases because plaintiff Florence Gillmor did sign that
lease, in her capacity as an owner of one 40 acre parcel
of more than 7,000 acres subject to that lease).

(ou~

That lease,

however, is in all essential respects identical to the other
two leases, with the sole exception of the reference to one
piece of property owned by plaintiff at that time, and it is
obvious that all three leases were drafted at the same time
from one model.
For example, the very first page of the Salt Lake County
lease identifies only Edward Lincoln Gillmor as a lessor
(R. 293).

At page 5 of that lease, the text provides that "the

above Lessor and his daughter, Florence J. Gillmor, do hereby
lease and let .

. their full interest in" an additional 80

acres of land, 40 acres which were then owned by plaintiff's
father and 40 acres which were owned by plaintiff (R. 294).
The remainder of the lease consistently refers to the "Lessor"
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ln the singular, not in the plural

(id.).

'"'he only reference

in that entire lease to "Lessors" in the plural is on the last
page, immediately preceding the signatures of plaintiff and her
father

(R.

295).

It was proper for the trial court to construe the three
leases together, because they were executed at the time,
between the same parties, and as part of the same transaction.
Cassel v. Anderson, 507 P.2d 444, 446
Landlord & Tenant, §232(13).

(N.M. 1973); 51 C.J.S.

As plaintiff was not a party to

the Tooele and Summit leases, this construction reaffirms a
conclusion that the "present lessor" in all three leases was
her father.
Both in the summary judgment notion and at trial, it was
plaintiff's position that all three leases are clear and
unambiguous, that the intent of the parties can easily be
ascertained from the documents themselves, and that there was
therefore no reason for the court below to take evidence on
surrounding circumstances at the time the parties entered into
these agreements.

It is well settled that the construction and

interpretation of a lease unambiguous in its terms is a question
of law for the court.

The intention of the parties and the

meaning of the lease are to be deduced from the plain, general
and common meaning of those terms.
Corp. v. Blair, 565 P.2d 776

E.g., Commercial Building

(Utah 1977); Ephraim Theatre Co.

v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 166, 321 P.2d 221

(1958).
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The plain and unambiguous language of the leases here in
question demonstrates that the extension option was intended by
the parties to be contingent upon the satisfaction of an
express condition precedent, i.e., that ownership of the
premises be vested in 1978 (the normal lease expiration date)
in Edward Lincoln Gillmor, plaintiff's father.

Because the

intention of the parties is readily ascertained from the face
of those leases, no othe= rules of construction should have
been or were invoked to interpret the Tooele and Summit County
leases.

Western Devel. Corp. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d

452 (1955).

For that matter, plaintiff still asserts that the

parties' intention

~as

also just as easily ascertained from the

face of the Salt Lake County lease, although the trial court
did in fact allow evidence on surrounding circumstances at
trial.
Defendant also asserted, both in the summary judgment proceedings and at trial, that several provisions in the leases
are ambiguous because they may be interdependent (e.g.,
R. 229-30).

The thrust of plaintiff's argument on this issue

is that the renewal option in each lease must be construed in
conjunction with a separate provision in each lease which
grants the lessee a first option to purchase the property under
specified circumstances (id.).

Both judges in the court below,

however, properly disregarded that argument, as it is also well
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settled that lease covenants will be construed as independent
unless they are expressly made dependent, which is not the case
with these leases.

6 Williston on Contracts, §890 at 588-89

(3d ed.); Enos v. Foster, 317 P.2d 670, 672

(Cal. App. 1958),

citing Restatement of Contracts, §290; Thompson v. Harris,
452 P.2d 122, 126 (Ariz. App. 1969), citing Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, §290.

As defendant was unable to recall any

evidence at trial which might support his argument on this
issue, the trial court also correctly rejected his assertion on
the independent grounds of his failure of proof.
As to the Salt Lake County lease, it expressly refers in
several places to the "lessor" in the singular, refers in one
place to the "lessor and his daughter," and refers only above
the signature lines to "lessors" in the plural.

Because of its

multiple references to the lessor in the singular, a strong
inference is created that "the present Lessor" of the Salt Lake
lease is plaintiff's father, and not plaintiff herself.

In

Geyer v. Lietzan, 102 N.E.2d 199 (Ind. 1952), the Indiana
Supreme Court held that a lease for two years which expressly
referred in some places to the "lessee and his heirs," but
which referred only to "the lessee" in the renewal clause was
to be construed as conferring a renewal right personal only to
the named lessee and not available to his heirs or assigns.
The court stated:
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Here the initial term is granted to "Ira
B. Geyer, and to his heirs, assigns,
executors and administrators," but when
we come to the renewal clause the privilege
is extended to the lessee only.
His heirs,
assigns, etc. are not mentioned.
It is not
necessary to a covenant running with the land
that the words heirs, assigns, etc. be used,
but the use, the manner of use, or the failure
to use those words may be most important to
the discovery of the intention of the parties.
The inclusion of those words in one place, and
their omission in another, may be most significant.
Considering this, and much of
the other language of the lease which we
will not pause to point out, it seems to
us that the right to renew the lease was
not extended to those in privity with the
lessee, but instead was personal to him.
As in

~.

plaintiff asserted in the court below that

the consistent reference in all three leases, including the
Salt Lake County lease, to the ''lessor" in the singular, and
the identification of the lessor on the first page of each
lease as Edward Lincoln Gillmor, create a strong inference that
plaintiff's father was the only intended "present lessor," so
the renewal option was a personal covenant dependent on whether
plaintiff's father survived to the expiration of the normal
lease term.
The holdings by both judges below that this renewal option
was a covenant personal to Edward Lincoln Gillmor and that this
covenant does not run with the land are also amply supported by
prior decisions of this Court.
on the sununary judgment appeal

Defendant argues in his brief
(at 6-7) that covenants to renew

leases always run with the land.

This argument overlooks both
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the clear language of the leases themselves and Utah law on
this issue.

Defendant cites no Utah decisions in support of

his contention, an omission doubtless the result of the fact
that Utah law is directly contrary to his position.
This Court has clearly stated that before a covenant will
run with the land it must appear, "either in the express words,
or in the nature of the transaction and the covenant, that it
was intended by the parties to run to subsequent transferees.''
First Western Fidelitv v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 27 Utah 2d 1, 4,
492 P.2d 132, 134 (1971).

The Court in that case further noted

that a covenant runs with the land only if it meets both the
requirement of intent and if it would have "some permanent
effect of a physical nature upon the land itself affecting its
usefulness and/or its value"

(emphasis supplied).

It is clear that the extension provisions in this case
have no "permanent effect of a physical nature" upon the land.
Neither of the conditions necessary for a covenant to run with
the land is present in this case.

Regardless of the position

adopted in other jurisdictions, the law in Utah is clear: the
extension provisions in these leases do not run with the land
and are therefore terminated.
The position expressed in the First Western decision is
consonant with the general principle, applied in construing
contracts as well as in construing covenants, that courts should
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give effect to the intention of the parties as evidenced by the
plain meaning of their agreement:
The rule of construction which obtains with
regard to express covenants in leases
requires them to be interpreted according
to the obvious intention of the parties as
collected from the whole context of the
instrument and in consonance with the
reasonable sense of the words employed.
[Citations omitted].
-- Fuchs v. Goe, 163 P.2d 783, 793
(Wyo. 1945).
In this case, the extension option in each of the leases
provides that the lessee may exercise that option only if
''ownership of this property is vested in the present Lessor."
In all three leases at issue herein, Edward Lincoln Gillmor,
plaintiff's father, was the sole "present Lessor."

Accordingly,

it is beyond dispute that when plaintiff's father died the
defendant irretrievably lost the right to renew these leases.
The intention of the parties could not have been more clearly
expressed.
For the foregoing reasons, both judges in the trial court
correctly ruled that these leases should be terminated on
December 31, 1978, and that defendant could not exercise the
renewal options in those leases.
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POINT II
JUDG~lliNT WAS
APPROPRIATELY ENTERED
IN THIS CASE.

DECLAP~TORY

Defendant asserts in both his briefs on appeal (1) that
this case was not ripe for judgment, and (2) that judgment was
inappropriate because of "ongoing activities which may change
the factual situation."

Defendant's summary judgment brief at

4-6; final judgment brief at 10-11.

Neither argument has

merit.
The issues presented to the trial court were fully ripe
for adjudication.

The leases in question were to expire within

eight months of defendant's motion for summary judgment, and
within two months follov1ing trial, hardly a remote time frame.
Those leases have now all expired.

Had those leases already

expired before commencement of suit, plaintiff's action would
have been for unlawful detainer rather than for declaratory
judgment.
The purpose of declaratory judgment is "to settle and
afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to
rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered."
Ann .

( 19 53 ) .

Section 78-33-12, Utah Code

Thus, the Declaratory Judgment Act is fairly

interpreted as a vehicle for determining rights between parties
once a justiciable controversy arises but before either party
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has acted to cause injury to the other.

Such an interpretation

was recently approved by this Court in Salt Lake County v.
Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119, 120 (Utah 1977).
In that case the County sought a declaratory judgment to
determine, inter alia, whether the City could terminate the
County's water supply.

In discussing the Declaratory Judgment

Act, the Court explained:
The purpose of the creation of the declaratory judgment procedure was to avoid the
difficulties of the common-law rule that
rights would not be adjudicated by a court
unless there had been a violation for which
relief could be granted; and to provide a
means for resolving uncertainties and
controversies before trouble has developed
or harm has occurred and in order to avoid
future litigation.
In its answer the City asserted that it was under no obligation
to furnish water to the County, and that even if it were under
such an obligation, there had as yet been no decrease or termination of the water supply and therefore no injury to the County.
Thus, the City reasoned, there was no present controversy to
justify declaratory judgment.
This Court rejected the City's argument and ruled that a
declaratory judgment was proper "to relieve uncertainty and
insecurity and to avoid possible controversy and harm."
P.2d at 121.

570

To the same effect is Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah

434, 228 P.2d 818, 820

(1951)

(purpose of declaratory judgment

is to "stabilize uncertain legal relations").

A..'1d see Parker

v. Rampton, 28 Utah 2d 36, 497 P.2d 848, 851 (1972)

(purpose
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is "to provide a means for securing adjudication without the
necessity of someone having to suffer damage or get into
serious difficulty before he could seek to have his rights
determined in court").
As plaintiff argued to the court below, she would be
materially harmed if the court had ruled that this case was not
ripe for adjudication.

First, her property would be occupied

unlawfully if the defendant were to remain on the land after
the end of the year.

Second, she would be prevented from re-

leasing the property at a higher rental which would more closely
approximate the fair rental value of those propertles in today's
market.

The court's determination that the case was ripe for

adjudication was an adoption of a salutary judicial policy,
allowing a lessor to arrange for a subsequent tenancy and to
minimize the time when his or her land is unoccupied.
Utah law further provides that "a contract may be construed
either before or after there has been a breach thereof."
Section 78-33-3, Utah Code Ann.

(1953)

(emphasis supplied).

That statutory provision, construed in conjunction with the
Declaratory Judgment Act mandate that the Act should be
"liberally construed and administeren," clearly reaffirms the
two decisions below to grant declaratory judgment on the
extension provision in the leases.

Other state courts have

similarly found that covenants associated with real property
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may properly be construed through declaratory judgment.
Marra v. Aetna Construction Co., 101 P.2d 490

E.g.,

(Calif. 1940).

Defendant's second assertion of error, i.e., that summary
judgment should not have been granted because of ongoing facts
which might change the relationship of the parties, is similarly devoid of merit.

The "ongoing facts" to which defendant

refers are, of course, the respective ownership positions of
the parties arising out of the partition action on which this
Court recently ruled.
In the partition suit, this plaintiff and defendant presented opposing theories of the best manner in which to partition the subject properties, and the court below ruled that
plaintiff's theory of partition should govern the trial.

The

parties proceeded to put on evidence at trial on their theories
of partition, reserving until a later date questions of the
proper allocation of appurtenant rights among the parties.
Following that first phase of the trial, the partition appeal
was taken by this defendant.

This Court ruled that the trial

court's judgment on that first phase should be reversed and
remanded because the case had only been "half tried'' by the
time it went up on appeal.

The Court noted that further evi-

dence should be presented at trial to ensure that the trial
court gives "due consideration" to "the interests, the contentions and demands of the parties." Gillmor v. Gillmor, Case
No. 15457 (Utah March 23, 1979).
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In other words, while the partition judgment of the court
below was in effect at the time of trial of the case at bar,
and the parties were at that time owners in severalty of the
Gillmor properties, the parties have recently been returned to
their status as tenants in common of those properties, by
virtue of this Court's vacating the partition judgment.

Plain-

tiff argued in both phases of the case at bar, however, and
reiterates now that the outcome of that partition suit is
wholly irrelevant to a determination of the propriety of entering a declaratory judgment on these leases.

The simple fact of

the matter is that, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the
partition suit, the case at bar simply operated to terminate
whatever leasehold interest the defendant might otherwise be
entitled to by virtue of his leases from the plaintiff's father.
That question is one which is entirely separate from the issues
raised in the partition proceeding, which are concerned only
with (1)

the rights of tenants in common inter se, a separate

issue from their rights as lessees; and (2) defendant's ultimate rights to use and occupy parcels of land formerly occupied
by him as a tenant in common but ultimately to be awarded in
severalty as a result of partition.

As the rights of lessees

to occupy and use land are governed by entirely separate law
from the rights to co-tenants to use and occupy land, the
partition suit has no impact upon this case.
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Defendant simply stated below, and again urges on this
appeal, that the partition case should have been considered by
the court below "in view of the silence of the lease as to the
effect thereon of partition."

Defendant's summary judgment

brief at 5; final judgment brief at 11.

The law is well

established, however, that (1) a lease by less than all cotenants is not a bar to partition, and (2) after partition in
kind, any lessee will simply be entitled to apply whatever
leasehold interest he has to any portion of the common property
which is assigned to his lessor.
In support of the principle that the existence of a lease
joined in by only part of the co-tenants does not bar partition
in kind are,

~·

Roberts v. Burnett, 137 S.E. 773 (Ga. 1927);

Thomas v. Farr, 44 N.E.2d 434

(Ill. 1942); Jackson v. O'Rorke,

98 N.W. 1068 (Neb. 1904).
Cases stating the principle that any lessee will be
entitled to apply his lease to whatever area of the common
property is assigned to his lessor after partition include
Trowbridoe v. Donner, 40 K.h'.2d 655 (Neb. 1950), and Phillips
v. Dulany, 77 S.E. 449

(Va. 1913).

Shares of the common

property alloted to co-ov.'Tiers who did not join in the lease
will be taken free of the lease.

~.

Trowbridge v. Donner,

supra; Nelson v. Wentworth, 138 N.E. 917 (Mass. 1923).
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In summary, then, as plaintiff urged to the court below,
this case was in fact ripe for declaratory judgment, and the
outcome of the appeal on the partition action was and still is
irrelevant to a determination of whether the leases could be
terminated.

Since the leases between plaintiff's father and

the defendant covered the entirety of the common property held
by each of them, the effect of this declaratory judgment is
simply to preclude the defendant from claiming any leasehold
interest in any of those subject properties which are
eventually awarded to the plaintiff.

For that reason, the

trial court's judgment should be affirmed.

POINT III
SUMMARY JUDGHEI\T WAS PROPERLY
ENTERED BECAUSE THERE ARE NO
HATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT.
Defendant argues, citing numerous authorities, the wellsettled proposition that summary judgment is precluded where
there are material issues of fact remaining for resolution
betv1een the parties

(Defendant's summary judgment brief at 7-9).

The only reference which defendant makes in that brief, however, to any such alleged issues of fact is the following:
In this case there is no evidence of facts
or circumstances surrounding the execution
of the lease and the court should not permit
the drastic procedure of summary judgment
to be substituted for a trial.
Id. at 8.
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The only other issues of fact raised at all by defendant
on the summary judgment appeal concern the expiration date of
the leases and whether or not Florence Gillmor was in fact her
father's successor in interest.

As noted in the preceding

discussion of facts, however, both those issues were dissipated
prior to hearing on plaintiff's motion.

The first issue was

obviated by stipulation, and the second issue was countered by
the defendant's own express admission in his pleadings in the
partition action that Florence Gillmor is her father's successor
in interest to the Gillmor livestock properties.
Accordingly, there were no material issues of fact which
could have precluded summary judgment in this case, and the
trial court correctly granted plaintiff's motion.

In addition,

even if this Court concludes that it was error to grant plaintiff's summary judgment motion, she wishes respectfully to
point out that defendant has not been damaged by that ruling.
All three leases were reviewed at trial, defendant introduced
evidence on all those leases, and the trial court independently
concurred in the summary judgment ruling.

Defendant has had

his full day in court on all the issues he raises in his
summary judgment appeal, and he had that hearing well before
those leases expired.

For this independent reason, plaintiff

requests affirmance of that ruling below.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID ALLOW EVIDENCE
OF SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES AT TRIAL,
SO DEFENDkNT'S CONTENTIONS ON
THAT ISSUE ARE DEVOID OF MERIT.
Defendant argues vigorously in his final judgment appeal
brief that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of
surrounding circumstances which preceded execution of the
leases at issue here.

Defendant's brief at 5, 7-9.

As noted

in the preceeding factual discussion, however, the trial
court did allow defendant to present all his evidence on such
surrounding circumstances, a fact which review of the trial
transcript references cited by the defendant will easily bear
out, and so this argument by defendant is totally without
merit.
It is true that plaintiff sought to exclude evidence of
surrounding circumstances because the leases are clear and
unambiguous, but as plaintiff was unsuccessful in seeking to
exclude that evidence, there is no basis for appeal on that
issue by the defendant.
tiff's objections).

E.g., R. 256, 275 (overruling plain-

It is true that defendant was unable to

introduce much evidence on any such surrounding circumstances,
but his lack of success in presenting such evidence was simply
a result of all parties' lack of recollection of those circumstances, and not of any rulings by the trial court.

Even

defendant himself, who apparently urged the introduction of
such evidence because he thought it would help his position,
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was unable to recall any of the negotiations leading to execution, not only of the current leases signed in 1969, but also
of the 1953 and 1957 predecessor leases.
Defendant argues that the leases are ambiguous as to
whether the renewal provisions in those leases were intended to
be personal or a covenant running with the land.
final judgment brief at 8.

Defendant's

Defendant did not present any

evidence supporting any position he might have on that ambiguity,
however, so this again is a matter of which he may not now
complain.
Finally, he asserts on appeal that it is unclear whether the
renewal options

we~e

to operate only if the land was sold.

Defendant's final judgment appeal brief at 9.

Again, he failed

to introduce any evidence on that ambiguity, although he did
argue it to the court below at the end of the trial (R. 299300).

Since he could present the trial court with no evidence

on this "ambiguity," this also is a matter on which he can:wt
now complain.
In sununary, if defendant was unable to present much evidence
regarding surrounding circumstances, this was only a result of
all parties' complete inability to recall those circumstances,
and was not a result of any exclusion of evidence by the court
below, for which reason this argument of defendant's is a
creature of fiction.
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POINT V
IF INDEED THERE AP£ ANY AMBIGUITIES
IN THESE LEASES, THOSE AMBIGUITIES MUST
BE CONSTRUED AGAINST DEFENDANT BECAUSE
HE DRAFTED THEM.
Unrebutted evidence at trial established that Mr. Skeen,
defendant's counsel herein, drafted the three leases at issue
in this case, and that at that time he represented the defendant,
but he did not represent plaintiff's father (R. 258,260).
Since these leases were drafted by the defendant-lessee, not by
the lessor, they must be construed against the lessee.
Defendant asserts several alleged ambiguities in those
leases on these appeals.

He contends that the reference in

those leases to the "present lessor" is ambiguous, that it is
unclear whether the renewal option was to run with the land or
not, that the interrelationship of the renewal option and the
purchase option in those leases is uncertain, and that an
ambiguity is created because plaintiff's father "was 92 or 93
years old in 1969 when the lease was made"

(defendant's final

judgment appeal brief at 7).
A proposition so fundamental that it does not merit
citation is that the courts will not rewrite contracts simply
because the parties might have made themselves a better bargain, particularly where, as in this case, their language
clearly evidences their intent to enter into precisely such an
agreement.

Again, it is plaintiff's position that these leases
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are clear and unambiguous and

because of that clear and

~hat,

unambiguous language, defendant was not entitled to renew those
leases.

If this Court should disagree with plaintiff in that

assertion, however, plaintiff respectfully wishes to point out
here that any such ambiguities must be resolved in her favor
and against the defendant, whose representative drafted these
leases.

Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931

(Utah 1975);

Holley v. Federal-American Partners, 29 Utah 2d 212, 507 P.2d
381 (1973); Russell v. Valentine, 14 Utah 2d 26, 376 P.2d 548
(1962).
Accordingly, even should this Court determine that there
were any ambiguities in these leases, the rulings below should
be affirmed nonetheless, as any such ambiguities must be
resolved against defendant and in favor of plaintiff.

COl~CLUSION

The rulings of the court below, both on partial summary
judgment and on final judgment, were correct and should be
~

affirmed by this Court on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/1

---'-

cav
of April, 1979.
"

of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LA7IMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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